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RICHARD WALLASCHEK (1860–1917) is most widely
known for his contributions to comparative musicol-
ogy; however, he also made significant contributions to
the field of music psychology. From 1890 to 1895,
Wallaschek pursued interdisciplinary studies at the
British Museum in London. During this time Wallaschek
proposed theories about the perception and production
of music. According to Wallaschek, the perception of
music occurs through two types of mental representation:
Tonvorstellung (tone representation), which referred to
the perception of individual musical elements, and
Musikvorstellung (music representation), which referred
to the perception of the higher-order structure of
music. Wallaschek emphasized Gestalt-like concepts in
his discussion of Musikvorstellung. He also proposed a
theory about the production of music, arguing that
music and language involve different brain processes.
For Wallaschek, music is an expression of emotion
while language is an expression of the intellect.
Although not widely recognized, Wallaschek was an
early contributor to the field of music psychology.
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R ICHARD WALLASCHEK (1860–1917) is mostwidely known for his contributions to compara-tive musicology, in particular for his work on
the origins of music. In his 1893 book, Primitive
Music, Wallaschek described his theories about the ori-
gins of music, which are still considered significant today
(Bujic´, 1988; Seeger, 1991; Solie, 1998). Wallaschek is
also known for his work in music aesthetics and criti-
cism (McColl, 1992, 1996, 1998). Although less widely
acknowledged, he made significant contributions to the
field of music psychology (Kümmel, 1973; Maitland,
Charlton, & Lodato, 2001; Wellek, 1968). Wallaschek
took an interdisciplinary approach to the developing field
of music psychology that included integrating neurology,
philosophy, psychology, and comparative musicology.
Wallaschek formulated his initial ideas about music
psychology from 1890 to 1895 during his studies at the
British Museum in London. Although Germany was
regarded as a center for music psychology in the nine-
teenth century, England was also considered an impor-
tant center for interdisciplinary music scholarship
(Bujic´, 1988; Graf, 1965). British psychologists James
Sully (1843–1923) and Edmund Gurney (1847–1888)
represented the English school of music psychology
(Bujic´, 1984–1985; Sully, 1886). Even Carl Stumpf
(1848–1936) recognized the importance of music psy-
chology in England (Stumpf, 1885). Other British schol-
ars who wrote about music and behavior included Charles
Darwin (1809–1882) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).
England was also one of the major centers for the new
field of neurology (Koehler, 1999). Many late-nineteenth-
century neurologists, including British neurologists
William Gowers (1845–1915) and John Hughlings
Jackson (1835–1911), studied impairments in music
abilities after brain damage.
Wallaschek’s writings about music psychology have
received less attention than his other works; therefore,
the aim of this article is to describe Wallaschek’s theo-
ries of music psychology, with a particular emphasis on
his contributions during his time in London.
Biographical Sketch
Wallaschek was born in the Moravian town of Brünn, in
the current Czech Republic, on November 6, 1860. He
was exposed to music at a young age and played piano
while he was growing up (Wallaschek, 1894a). After
receiving a doctorate in philosophy from the University
of Tübingen in 1885 and a doctorate in law from the
University of Bern the next year (1886b), he completed
a habilitation in philosophy (Wallaschek, 1888, 1889)
at the University of Freiburg (Graf, 1965; Partsch,
1985). His early interest in music is apparent in his
first interdisciplinary music publication, Ästhetik der
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Tonkunst (1886a), which summarized his ideas about
the aesthetics of music.
Wallaschek became interested in music, psychology,
and neurology and chose to pursue interdisciplinary
studies at the British Museum in London from 1890 to
1895. The museum provided access to a broad range of
academic resources, including writings and artifacts in
the areas of psychology, anthropology, ethnology, and
neurology. In a letter to the principal librarian (dated
December 15, 1890), Wallaschek asked to renew his
reading ticket at the British Museum and stated, “I am
writing a book on the ethnography of music” (Figure 1).
London was a logical place for Wallaschek to develop
his ideas about music psychology; it had all the ingredi-
ents for his interdisciplinary approach. During his
5 years in London, Wallaschek developed two pri-
mary theories of music psychology, one involving the
perception of music and the other focusing on produc-
tion, or expression, of music.
In 1896, after completing his studies in London,
Wallaschek returned to Austria and habilitated with
Ernst Mach (1838–1916) at the University of Vienna in
the aesthetics and psychology of music. His habilitation
and subsequent teaching appointment at the university
are considered the formal beginning of the academic
discipline of comparative musicology (Graf, 1965, 1974;
Kümmel, 1973). He taught psychology and aesthetics of
music, mainly at the University of Vienna where he was
a contemporary of Guido Adler (1855–1941). His main
student was Robert Lach (1874–1958), who studied
with him from 1896 to 1899. Lach is most widely
known for his work in ethnomusicology; he succeeded
Wallaschek at the University of Vienna (Potter, 2004).
Wallaschek’s and Lach’s influence continued through
Lach’s students, such as Ida Halpern, Karl Steiner, Kurt
Wöss, and Hans Tischler.
In 1905 Wallaschek expanded upon his ideas of music
perception and production in his book Psychologie und
Pathologie der Vorstellung. This book received positive
reviews in journals such as The Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods (Pitkin, 1905), Mind
(Mackenzie, 1906), and The Philosophical Review
(Bentley, 1906). Wallaschek’s final scholarly work, Psy-
chologische Aesthetik, was published posthumously in
1930 by Oskar Katann, an Austrian writer on philoso-
phy and aesthetics. This final book was a compilation of
Wallaschek’s previous writings, including his 1905
book. Wallaschek died at the age of 56 in Vienna on
April 24, 1917 (Lach, 1917).
The following sections discuss Wallaschek’s theories
of music perception and music production and place
him within the late-nineteenth-century development of
music psychology.
Music Perception: Tonvorstellung and
Musikvorstellung
Wallaschek described his initial ideas about the percep-
tion of music in three primary papers (1894a, 1894b,
1895), in which he drew upon ideas from philosophy,
psychology, and comparative musicology. He revisited
these ideas in two subsequent books (1905, 1930).
Based on his observations of musicians and nonmusi-
cians, as well as on his own introspection, Wallaschek
concluded that some people appreciate an artistic per-
formance, even if mistakes are made, while others only
notice individual pitches, chords, and other musical
elements without comprehending the whole.
These observations led him to speculate that the per-
ception of music occurs through two levels of mental
representation, Tonvorstellung (tone representation) and
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Musikvorstellung (music representation). Wallaschek
proposed that Tonvorstellung is the processing of indi-
vidual musical elements, such as pitch, intervals, or
chords. A person using this level of music representa-
tion would “possess a perfectly clear idea of the tones,
chords, harmonies, and modulations of a musical piece”
(1894a, p. 259). In contrast, Musikvorstellung refers to
the perception of higher-order musical structure, which
is a more general framework created by a combination
of individual tones, intervals, and chords and which
also includes rhythm, timing, dynamics, and the more
“expressive powers” of music.
These two levels of mental representation generally
coexist in individuals; when asked to pay attention to
individual musical elements, a composer or listener will
utilize the Tonvorstellung process, but when listening to
a piece as a whole, Musikvorstellung will dominate.
Wallaschek described this further by stating:
. . . in the most cases, we do not distinctly perceive
every tone, and yet we get the whole framework, as
it were, of the music into our mind . . . as a whole,
although not quite distinctly and definitely in all its
elements. And we hear or perceive music just as it is
actually played, i.e., with numerous omissions, various
mistakes and involuntary variations such as the great-
est artist, the best orchestra cannot help making some-
times. (1894a, p. 264)
Thus, even when mistakes are made, the Musikvor-
stellung process allows the global framework to be per-
ceived. However, according to Wallaschek, not all people
are capable of perceiving this framework of music.
Some people with a highly developed perception of
tones (Tonvorstellung) do not comprehend music as a
whole. He noted, “In these people the ability is wanting
to comprehend the mass of tones and chords as one
connected whole, to find out the organic union in the
succession of sounds” (1894a, p. 259).
To illustrate this point, Wallaschek described an inci-
dent he observed in which two musicians were dis-
cussing a performance of Wagner. They felt the piece
was not organized in terms of chords, modes, or modu-
lations; they did not enjoy the performance and did not
understand the composition. Such listeners, Wallaschek
explained, rely on Tonvorstellung and are unable to com-
prehend the piece as a whole. Instead, they are “drowned”
in theoretical considerations of individual musical ele-
ments. When listening to Wagner, whose music in
Wallaschek’s opinion requires a holistic understanding,
listeners whose predominant mental representation for
music is that of Tonvorstellung will hear an “indiscrimi-
nate noise,” a phrase often used to refer to “modern”
Romantic music. Therefore, Wallaschek argued, in order
to fully understand “modern” music like Wagner’s, one
must perceive the framework as a whole, as being more
than the sum of individual elements.
Listening Types
For both Tonvorstellung and Musikvorstellung,
Wallaschek proposed “listening types” that reflect dif-
ferences in the way individuals represent music. He
remarked: “How do we think of tones at all? Surely, we
are not all alike, and the tones in our mind have as dif-
ferent shapes as words and their meanings” (1894a,
p. 259). Thus, he acknowledged an association between
music and the mental processes of individuals. He pro-
vided an analogy:
Just as in hearing the word “justice”, one may think of
the law-court, another of the characters in which the
word is written, while a third hears it spoken in his
mind; so in thinking of a tone, one associates it with the
written note or the key-board, the other with the
motion necessary to play it on an instrument, the third
is satisfied with sound alone. (1894a, p. 259)
Wallaschek’s three “listening types” were based on the
work of French psychologist Théodule Ribot (1839–
1916). Wallaschek referenced Ribot, and both attended
the International Congress of Experimental Psychology
held in London in 1892 (Macdonald, 1892). At this con-
gress, Ribot discussed different ways in which individu-
als think of concepts. He described an experiment in
which he asked 100 individuals to write down their
“state of consciousness” after hearing a series of abstract
terms. Based on these responses, Ribot (1891) outlined
three ways in which people conceptualize ideas: “Type
concret,” “Type visuel typographique,” and “Type
auditif.” Wallaschek (1894b, 1930) compared his listen-
ing types to Ribot’s types, in particular to Ribot’s type
auditif. Wallaschek described a visual type, motor type,
and sound type, which are based on associations with
thoughts, images, or movements.
Visual type. The visual type associates tones and
music with visual images. When listening to individual
elements (and the Tonvorstellung process is in play), lis-
teners imagine the written notation of what they are
hearing, or the keys on a keyboard being played. When
the Musikvorstellung process is engaged, visual types
associate music with images of landscapes, scenes, or
pictures, without thinking of individual tones. For exam-
ple, Wallaschek described a woman who, when hearing
Saint-Saens’ Danse Macabre, imagined “an ocean beach
illuminated by moonlight with fishermen sitting
Richard Wallaschek’s Nineteenth-Century Contributions to the Psychology of Music 295
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Mon, 17 Nov 2014 12:13:29 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ashore, lighting a campfire” (1894b, p. 9). Wallaschek
also described the well-known writer and musician
E.T.A. Hoffman as a visual type, referring to his use of
the phrase “green fields” and other pastoral phrases to
describe Haydn’s symphonies. As these examples imply,
the visual type of Musikvorstellung hears music and
imagines a more global visual image than does the visual
type of Tonvorstellung.
Motor type. Wallaschek (1894b) described six differ-
ent motor types, who associate tones with physical
movements. For Tonvorstellung, music can be associ-
ated with movements required to play an instrument.
For Musikvorstellung, music can be associated with (a)
movements that make the beat explicit, as in dancing;
(b) movements of the body, as in waving hands or arms;
and (c) body movements in the context of drama, as in
opera. Wallaschek’s final two motor types associate
music with movement of the larynx (subvocalizations
of what is heard). He did not discuss whether these last
two types are associated with only one process or with
both processes of Vorstellung.
Sound type. The sound type associates tones and
music with the sound itself and has no corresponding
thoughts or images. Wallaschek described two kinds of
sound types; the first he said was analogous to Ribot’s
type auditif. With this sound type, listeners enjoy indi-
vidual tones, intervals, and chords but do not know what
to do with an entire composition. There is no com-
prehension of rhythm and time, and the pieces are not
heard as organic wholes. Wallaschek also suggested that
individuals with absolute pitch, who are able to identify
pitch independent of a reference pitch, are examples of
the sound type. In his earlier papers (1894a, 1894b) he
described this type as existing for both Tonvorstellung
and Musikvorstellung, but in his posthumous 1930 book
he described this sound type as an inferior type used for
imagining or representing tones but not for representing
music. Wallaschek described a second sound type in
which music is perceived and treated as a formal game of
the intellect, as one would think of mathematics or logic.
A particular listening type for tones does not necessar-
ily predict a listening type for music. Wallaschek gave
the example of a person who is a visual Musikvorstellung
type and a motor Tonvorstellung type, associating music
with visual images when listening to global aspects but
associating individual tones with motor movements.
Rhythmic Mental Representation
Although Wallaschek’s ideas about rhythm and meter do
not involve Tonvorstellung or Musikvorstellung, they do
involve the perception of a global framework for meter,
a process similar to Musikvorstellung. Wallaschek (1895)
described the mental process of “time-sense,” the act of
intuitively perceiving groups of beats within a piece of
music. Beats are not perceived individually but rather
are immediately grouped and perceived as a series of
groups making up measures:
The rhythm is in the object, while the time-division is
only the form in which our mind perceives the rhythm,
the way in which it arranges, systematizes, unites the
sensation of several beats into one whole period, into a
time-unity . . . this time-sense of the observer, his abil-
ity to arrange regular sensations into periods, to per-
ceive them not as single beats but as groups of beats, is
an immediate (intuitive) perception, i.e. the observer
does not arrive at this form of group-perception
through counting the number of beats which make up
one group (bar or period), but he immediately per-
ceives the group as such without the medium of count-
ing. (1895, p. 28)
Furthermore, this process of grouping is not done on
the level of sensation; it is a process of the mind.
Wallaschek described grouping as a “cortical process of
group perception,” something that happens in the
brain and is, therefore, higher-level mental processing.
He remarked, “The time-sense is . . . a mental work of
grouping the sensations, and this takes place not in the
senses themselves but in the cortex” (1895, p. 29).
Wallaschek was careful to emphasize that because
time-sense is a mental process, it does not exist in the
music per se. Thus, different people could perceive dif-
ferent metrical groupings when listening to the same
written meter.
Wallaschek’s theory in context: Tonpsychologie,
Musikpsychologie, and the Gestaltqualitäten movement
Wallaschek’s theory of music perception occurred at
a time when music psychology in Germany and Austria
was moving from the study of physiology and the
perception of individual musical elements (Tonpsycho-
logie) to the study of how individual musical elements fit
together into entire musical compositions (Musikpsycho-
logie). While Tonpsychologie focused on sensations
(Empfindungen), Musikpsychologie focused on concep-
tions, or mental representations (Vorstellungen) for
music.
The development of Tonpsychologie and Musikpsych-
ologie has been traced through several researchers, most
particularly Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894), Carl
Stumpf, Theodor Lipps (1851–1910), Hugo Riemann
(1849–1919), and Ernst Kurth (1886– 1946). The work
296 A. B. Graziano and J. K. Johnson
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of Helmholtz, Stumpf, and Lipps is generally character-
ized as Tonpsychologie, while Riemann and Kurth fall
into the Musikpsychologie category (Rothfarb, 1989;
Marvin, 1987).
The use of the term Vorstellung has a complex history
going back to Kant and Schopenhauer (Wason &
Marvin, 1992). The translation of the term is also diffi-
cult; it can be translated as idea, representation, presenta-
tion, imagination, or conception (Wason & Marvin,
1992). Wallaschek used the German terms Tonvorstellung
and Musikvorstellung not only in German (1894b) but
also in an English paper (1894a), in which he gave
English translations for both terms. His English transla-
tions vary from “mental tone representation” or simply
“tone representation” and “music representation,” to
“ideas of tones and music.” Wallaschek’s use of these
terms indicates he was thinking about mental representa-
tion—higher-order music cognition. His concept of
Tonvorstellung can be seen as part of Tonpsychologie—
the study of individual musical elements—while his con-
cept of Musikvorstellung lies within Musikpsychologie.
Wallaschek was not the first to talk about different lev-
els of perception. Helmholtz (1863, 1954) described three
levels involved with music perception: (a) the physical
level, concerned with the acoustic properties of sound;
(b) the physiological level, centered on processes within
the ear that give rise to sensations (Empfindungen); and
(c) the psychological level (psychologischen Tiel), where
sensations result in mental images (Vorstellungen) that
are perceptions (Wahrnehmungen). Helmholtz felt that
while the physical aspect of music had been addressed,
the physiological and psychological aspects of music
had not yet been adequately investigated and that it was
particularly important to look at physiological pro-
cesses. Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen (1863) is
primarily concerned with the physiological aspect of
music understanding, dealing with the development
and role of sensations.
Stumpf (1883) also described different levels of music
perception. The sense of hearing results in sensations
(Empfindungen), which become mental representa-
tions (Vorstellungen). Stumpf stressed that a mental
representation can be the result of hearing a stimulus or
of remembering one, which he described as an imag-
ined tone or other sound. Mental representations are
then judged or analyzed (Urteil) before understanding,
or knowledge (Erkenntnis), is achieved. If Helmholtz
went from the physical to the physiological, Stumpf
went from the physiological to the psychological. He
emphasized mental activity versus sensory activity.
However, Stumpf still investigated individual tones,
intervals, etc. without considering these in a musical
context. Like Helmholtz and Stumpf, Lipps, in an essay
in 1885, described a chain of perceptual events, from
the physical to the psychological (Lipps, 1905). Like
Stumpf, he emphasized the psychological while dealing
with individual musical elements removed from musi-
cal context.
The increasing emphasis on mental representation
for music seen in the work of Stumpf and Lipps was a
precursor to research in Musikpsychologie. In addition
to an emphasis on mental activity, Musikpsychologie
can be linked to early Gestalt ideas, particularly to the
work of Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932). Ehrenfels
first described “Gestaltqualitäten” as spatial and tempo-
ral patterns or forms, where the forms are holistic enti-
ties independent of the separate elements contained
within them (Ehrenfels, 1890). He believed such forms
are constructs of the mind and created from sensations
(Hillner, 1984; Schultz & Schultz, 2000). Ehrenfels (1890)
used music examples for his arguments and talked in
terms of mental representation. He used the term
Tonvorstellung in a general way, as an example of the
mental representation of holistic forms (Gestalt quali-
ties). Ehrenfels pointed out that when a melody is trans-
posed to a different key, it is heard as being identical to
the original melody, even though the two have a com-
pletely different set of pitches. Thus, he proposed, the
perception of a melody is more than the perception of its
individual parts. A melody is, therefore, a Gestalt quality
(Ash, 1995; Gjerdingen, 2002; Schultz & Schultz,2000).
In addition to Ehrenfels, Mach had made similar
arguments a few years earlier (1886/1959), and Stumpf,
with his emphasis on psychological factors, was one of
the main forerunners of the development of Gestalt-
psychologie in the early twentieth century. Stumpf ’s
students are considered to be the founders of the Gestalt
school, particularly Max Wertheimer (1880–1943),
Wolfgang Köhler (1887–1967), and Kurt Koffka (1886–
1941). Many of Stumpf ’s ideas are Gestalt-like in nature.
For example, he described how the initial judgment or
analysis of an interval (that has become a mental repre-
sentation based on sensations) is often not an analysis
of the relationship between the individual tones, but a
recognition of the sound as a whole (1883). In addition,
Stumpf ’s theory of tonal fusion (Tonverschmelzung) has
clear, Gestalt-like properties (Ash, 1995; Green &
Butler, 2002). Stumpf argued that when the two tones of
an interval are perceived as a whole rather than as two
separate elements, the tones have fused and a percep-
tion of consonance is the result. This occurs on a psy-
chological rather than a physiological level. Lipps, who
succeeded Stumpf at Munich in 1894, has also been
associated with early Gestalt ideas (Boring, 1950).
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Although mental activity had been discussed in
music scholarship before Ehrenfels’ (1890) paper, it had
not been a prominent feature of such scholarship.
Gjerdingen (2002) traces the emphasis on Tonvorstellung
in music scholarship from Ehrenfels to Riemann.
Riemann described his approach as “top down,” focused
on the mental representation of music, and saw it as a
continuation of the work of Helmholtz and Stumpf,
who practiced a “bottom up” physiological approach to
the study of music psychology (Riemann, 1914).
Riemann (1914) described his approach as a “new disci-
pline” and his essay as the “very first emphatic observa-
tion of the postulate” (Wason & Marvin, 1992, p. 83). He
discussed how music was a property of the human intel-
lect rather than a process based on physical and physio-
logical analysis of sound (Marvin, 1987; Rothfarb, 1989).
Like Riemann, Ernst Kurth (1913) focused on the men-
tal processing of music within a musical context rather
than on the perception of individual elements. The
foundation of music theory, he argued, should be the
mental experience (Rothfarb, 1989).
Wallaschek’s writings between 1890 and 1895 about
Tonvorstellung and Musikvorstellung are consistent
with both Musikpsychologie and the Gestaltqualitäten
movement. He focused specifically on mental represen-
tation for music, as opposed to physiological sensations.
Like Stumpf and Lipps, even when he described how
individual musical elements are perceived, he talked in
terms of mental processing (Tonvorstellung). However,
with his discussion of Musikvorstellung, his belief that
time-sense is a result of mental processing rather than
of sensation or the musical object itself, and his descrip-
tion of a holistic understanding of music, both for
melody and for rhythm (1894a, 1895), Wallaschek
emphasized higher-order cognitive processing to a
greater extent than did Helmholtz, Stumpf, or Lipps,
and earlier than Riemann or Kurth. For example,
Wallaschek stated in 1894:
. . . this ability of mentally representing tones does not
make up the musical mind. Music, as a whole, is some-
thing more than all the tones taken together, and we
may be able to have tones in our mind without having
music. (1894a, p. 263)
The question arises, did Wallaschek influence
Riemann or Kurth? Riemann was aware of Wallaschek
(Lach, 1917) but did not reference him in his essay on
Tonvorstellung (Riemann, 1914). It is possible that
Kurth was influenced by Wallaschek, since Kurth was a
student of Guido Adler’s at Vienna and may have had
contact with Wallaschek.
It is unclear how Wallaschek formed his ideas about
music representation. He may have been influenced by
Ehrenfels; however, he does not cite Ehrenfels in any
of his relevant papers or books. It is possible that
Wallaschek came into contact with Ehrenfels at the
University of Vienna where both studied philosophy in
the early 1880s. Wallaschek was influenced by Mach,
with whom he habilitated at the University of Vienna in
1895–96 (Welleck, 1968; Graf, 1965). He knew of
Mach’s work at least as early as 1893, which seems to be
his earliest reference to Mach. Wallaschek was also
influenced by Stumpf and referred to Stumpf ’s work as
early as 1891 (1891b).
Music Production: Music as an
Expression of Emotion
Wallaschek drew upon his background in philosophy,
psychology, and comparative musicology, as well as his
interest in neurology, to develop a theory about music
expression. He argued that music is an expression of
emotions, while speech is an expression of the intellect.
Although the idea that music is an expression of
emotion was not a new concept (Bujic´, 1988; Kivy,
2002), Wallaschek approached the topic from a differ-
ent perspective, drawing from theories about the ori-
gins of music and examples of patients from neurology.
Wallaschek first presented this idea in two papers that
were published in 1891, one in the British psychology
and philosophy journal, Mind (1891a), and the other in
the first German musicology journal, Vierteljahrsschrift
für Musikwissenschaft (1891b).
The theory that music evolved from speech, although
proposed much earlier, was commonly debated during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by philosophers,
psychologists, and comparative musicologists. Spencer
first wrote about the origins of music in 1857 (Spencer,
1857), and again several decades later in the journal
Mind (Spencer, 1890, 1891). His 1890 article was a post-
script to his 1857 essay and argued against the ideas
put forth by Darwin (1871) and Gurney (1876, 1880).
Spencer argued that music developed out of emotional
speech and Darwin refined this, later proposing that
music evolved from emotional language that was used to
attract the opposite sex. Gurney felt that music devel-
oped out of prosodic exaggerations of emotional speech.
In 1891 Wallaschek joined this discussion about the
origins of music. He disagreed with Spencer, Darwin,
and Gurney, proposing that music evolved from rhythm
and was an expression of emotion. He presented three
arguments to exemplify why music expression did not
evolve from speech. First, he argued that primitive vocal
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music with text had no relationship with conversational
speech and, therefore, could not have evolved from lan-
guage. He stated:
We find even in the most primitive state of culture a
sort of recitative, side by side with a kind of music, in
which the rhythm alone plays a leading part, and with
songs, the words of which are perfectly meaningless or
at least cannot be understood by the tribe in question.
In such circumstances, it is obviously impossible for the
musical modulations to have taken rise from the spo-
ken modulations, since there is no genuine speech in
the case at all. (1891a, p. 382)
Wallaschek pointed out that the words in primitive
songs often do not carry meaning and are not compre-
hended like words used in verbal communication. He
used the example of the Hottentots, a tribe in South
Africa, who adapted sections from other songs that they
did not understand and also composed songs with
meaningless text. Thus, because songs do not have
elements of meaningful language, Wallaschek argued,
music could not have evolved from speech. This argu-
ment continued to spark considerable debate into the
twentieth century (Antcliffe, 1916; Kivy, 1959; Levman,
1992; Newman, 1905/1969).
Next, Wallaschek asserted that the speech used in
songs develops later than conversational speech and
also represents a separate brain process. He noted: “I
have never heard an infant really sing—that is to say,
invent (though it may repeat) a song—before it could
actually speak” (1891a, p. 384); thus, he made a distinc-
tion between the creation and imitation of music.
Wallaschek also argued that if music developed out of
speech, it would be possible to identify elements of con-
versational speech in art songs in the same way that ele-
ments of primitive dance are evident in modern dance
styles. He stated:
. . . we should inevitably discern some traces of its devel-
opment in its continual advance from a primitive stage
up to perfectly artistic songs, just as we are able to follow
a parallel development from the movements of a primi-
tive, up to those of a modern dancer. (1891a, p. 383)
For Wallaschek, even though both conversational
speech and singing use vocal sounds, they represent
distinct modes of expression and rely on separate brain
processes.
Finally, Wallaschek argued that language used in
songs and language used in conversational speech are
dissociable in patients with certain neurological condi-
tions. Wallaschek (1891b, 1894b) discussed examples of
patients with aphasia, an acquired impairment of lan-
guage after brain damage, who were able to verbalize
words when singing despite limited conversational
speech. Wallaschek compiled cases from neurological
literature. For example, he described one patient who
was able to verbalize only “yes” and “no” but correctly
sang the text and melody for two verses of the song “I
Dreamt That I Dwelt in Marble Halls” (Gowers, 1887).
Another patient was only able to verbalize “mama” yet
was able to sing the tune and text of another song
(Knoblauch, 1888). These and other examples in nine-
teenth-century neurology literature (Falret, 1866;
Jackson, 1871) provided evidence for Wallaschek that
music and language abilities are independent processes
and rely on separate brain structures.
Wallaschek argued that it is possible to sing songs in
the context of aphasia because music is independent of
intellectual thought, which is required to produce con-
versational language. Wallaschek felt that the singing of
song texts is an expression of emotional language,
which remains preserved in aphasia. Furthermore, lan-
guage and music are dissociable because they depend
on different parts of the brain.
Wallaschek adapted his idea about music and lan-
guage from William Gowers and John Hughlings
Jackson, two prominent neurologists who also worked
in London. Gowers (1887, 1888) differentiated between
intellectual and emotional language based on observa-
tions of neurologic patients. He believed that ideas are
expressed by language in the form of propositions
(information units), whereas emotions are expressed by
simple and automatic methods, primarily by gesture.
Gowers noted that songs also express emotion and not
propositional language, stating: “No one intends to
express the propositions contained in the words of the
song. The words are used automatically, and this auto-
matic utterance must have been effected by the right
hemisphere” (1887, p. 134).
Jackson (1866, 1878, 1879) held similar views. He
observed aphasic patients who had limited spontaneous
speech yet were able to verbalize short phrases, which
he called “automatic speech” or “recurring utterances”
(e.g., “Oh my goodness,” “Thank you”). He proposed
that singing a song text is similar to automatic speech,
both being examples of emotional language. Jackson
(1879) described one patient:
His vocal organs act apparently well; he may be able to
sing. His emotional language is apparently unaffected.
He smiles, laughs, frowns, and varies his voice properly.
His recurring utterance comes out now in one tone and
now in another, according as he is vexed, glad etc.;
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(1848–1899) and Edith Simcox (1844–1901). Sully and
Gurney would also have been part of this intellectual
environment, although Gurney died 2 years before
Wallaschek arrived in London. Wallaschek knew Sully
personally, acknowledging him in his 1893 book,
Primitive Music, and probably interacted with Ribot at
the 1892 Congress of Experimental Psychology in
London, which they both attended (Macdonald, 1892).
Wallaschek also interacted with Spencer in their debate
on the origins of music in Mind. Spencer was cited by
several of these scholars (e.g., Sully, 1886; Jackson, 1866,
1878, 1879; Allen, 1877, 1878) and criticized by Gurney
(Gurney, 1882). Wallaschek was obviously familiar with
these individuals and cited their work. Thus,
Wallaschek’s interdisciplinary interests reflected the
interactive intellectual milieu in London during the late
nineteenth century.
Conclusions
Although not widely recognized today, Wallaschek was
an early contributor to the field of music psychology.
His stay in London from 1890 to 1895 was a pivotal
time for the synthesis of his interests in philosophy, psy-
chology, comparative musicology, and neurology. It was
during his stay in London that Wallaschek first pro-
posed his ideas about music perception and production.
Wallaschek’s discussion of Tonvorstellung and
Musikvorstellung was part of the development of
Musikpsychologie from Tonpsychologie. The distinc-
tion between these two kinds of music psychology was
discussed in the early twentieth century in the writings
of scholars like Riemann and Kurth. Tonpsychologie is
the study of physiology and the perception of individual
musical elements, emphasizing sensations, while
Musikpsychologie is the study of how individual musi-
cal elements fit together in entire musical compositions,
emphasizing mental processes. Wallaschek went farther
than did his contemporaries Helmholtz, Stumpf, and
Lipps in talking about mental processes. He made a dis-
tinction between the perception of individual tones on
one hand and of holistic musical compositions on the
other, in the 1890s, prior to Riemann or Kurth. He was
unique in that he used elements of both (Tonvorstellung
and Musikvorstellung) in his theory of music percep-
tion. Wallaschek also emphasized Gestalt-like qualities
in his discussion of Musikvorstellung and of rhythm
and meter.
Wallaschek differed from his contemporaries by
drawing upon neurology in his theory of music produc-
tion. He argued that music is an expression of emotion
and not an outgrowth of speech, as did Darwin, Spencer,
strictly we should say he sings his recurring utterance;
variation of voice being rudimentary song (Spencer);
he may be able to sing in the ordinary meaning of that
term. (p. 320)
Jackson, therefore, concluded that automatic language
is generated from emotion because single words or
phrases do not have intellectual or propositional value.
This quotation also demonstrates that Jackson was
familiar with Spencer’s theories of the origins of music
and suggests an interaction among the philosophers,
neurologists, and psychologists in late-nineteenth-cen-
tury London. Wallaschek, thus, built upon the observa-
tions of Gowers and Jackson by arguing that singing is
an expression of emotion and therefore dissociable
from conversational language. The dissociation of lan-
guage in singing and speech is an issue that continues to
interest researchers today. Recent research has addressed
the question by comparing the singing and speaking of
song texts in patients with aphasia (Cohen & Ford, 1995;
Hébert, Racette, Gagnon, & Peretz, 2003; Peretz, Gagnon,
Hébert, & Macoir, 2004). These authors conclude that
when task demands are controlled, there is no difference
between spoken and sung song texts, and verbal produc-
tion in speaking a song text and singing a song text is
subserved by the same mechanism. These findings are
consistent with Wallaschek’s, Gower’s, and Jackson’s idea
that automatic speech is similar to song texts.
Wallaschek was one of the first music scholars to con-
sider the brain in the process of music expression. His
use of neurological cases as evidence for his argument
and his idea of two distinct neurological processes—
one for emotion, one for intellectual thought—were not
commonly discussed among psychologists or compara-
tive musicologists during the nineteenth century. It is
clear from his writings that Wallaschek felt an under-
standing of the brain was essential for studies of music
psychology:
It is not the sense of hearing alone which is to be exam-
ined, but when the . . . psychology of music [is] in
question, the subject for inquiry should be the cortical
process. (1895, p. 33)
Furthermore, Wallaschek’s work was regarded by neu-
rologists as some of the earliest writings on music and
the brain (Ireland, 1894; Edgren, 1895; Probst, 1899;
Henschen, 1920).
While in London, Wallaschek most likely had the
opportunity to interact with scholars who discussed the
brain, such as neurologists Gowers, Jackson, and
Samuel Wilks (1824–1911) and writers Grant Allen
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and Gurney. He presented three arguments as to why
music is an expression of emotion, drawing from the
work of neurologists Jackson and Gowers, who were also
in London at the same time. Wallaschek argued that lan-
guage and music are independent processes and depend
on different parts of the brain. His descriptions of
patients with neurological conditions supported his
argument for two distinct neurological processes—one
for emotion, one for intellectual thought. It is clear from
his writings that Wallaschek felt an understanding of the
brain was essential for the study of music psychology.
Wallaschek was recognized during his lifetime for his
work in music psychology, as evidenced by his interac-
tions with Spencer (1890, 1891; Wallaschek, 1891a) and
by contemporary reviews of his work on music percep-
tion and production (Dixon, 1895; Bentley, 1906;
Mackenzie, 1906; Pitkin, 1905). His influence contin-
ued through the early twentieth century, as seen in
music perception literature (Kobelt, 1920; Marchand,
1932) and literature on music and language (Newman,
1905/1969; Antcliffe, 1916; Herzberg, 1924; Wilson,
1927; Levman, 1992). As mentioned above, Wallaschek
was recognized in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
neurology literature as one of the earliest writers on
music and the brain (Ireland, 1894; Edgren, 1895;
Probst, 1899; Henschen, 1920). Wallaschek’s work was
part of an explosion of scholarship in music psychology
stimulated by the development of new disciplines in the
late nineteenth century (e.g., psychology, neurology,
musicology). This article represents an attempt to
explore one aspect of the origins of music psychology as
a discipline.
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